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Abstract 
Bus networks carry 4.7 billion passenger trips a year in England, around three times the total number of trips made on national 
rail. But although buses are the backbone of public transport in large urban areas, they are often ignored in national policy 
debates, which tend to focus on higher profile infrastructure investment. In this paper we draw attention to the economic value of 
public funding for bus networks by applying a comprehensive cost benefit analysis framework to estimate the effect of three 
revenue-based bus policy measures in the context of the six English metropolitan areas: free travel for elderly and disabled 
people, fuel subsidy and subsidy of non-commercial bus services.  
We find that all three types of measure can have a Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) in excess of 1. In the case of fuel subsidy and 
subsidy for non-commercial peak services this can be in excess of 3, which is higher than for many infrastructure schemes. We 
also find that a significant proportion of benefits accrues to other road users in the form of reduced congestion. This work 
addresses an important gap in the empirical evidence base and also serves to highlight to decision makers the mechanisms 
through which revenue funding generates social and economic benefits. We show, in particular, that bus subsidies can be a highly 
effective distributional tool in addition to generating considerable transport benefits. Our framework should be easily transferable 
and could therefore be of value to other researchers and practitioners. 
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1. Introduction 
Many would agree that public transport networks make an important contribution to the economy (see, for 
example, APTA, 2014 or pteg, 2014). But buses are perhaps not the first thing that comes to mind when we think of 
how this economic contribution comes about. Yet, in most countries, bus services are the backbone of public 
transport networks. This is certainly the case in England, where buses carry 4.7 billion passengers each year, over 
three times the number using the national rail network. 
Despite the large number of people who rely on bus services across England every day, government funding for 
bus networks outside London is in decline. We estimate that government funding for bus networks will have fallen 
by around a quarter in real terms, between 2010/11 and 2014/15 (pteg, 2014a), leading to increases in fares, and 
reductions in services and patronage. This is driven, at least in part, by a lack of understanding of the economic 
contribution of bus networks. Many believe that bus subsidy functions essentially as an income re-distribution 
mechanism and bus networks as a safety net for those without access to better alternatives. 
The purpose of this paper is to challenge these views by articulating and quantifying the economic contribution of 
bus networks and of bus subsidy streams. We focus our analysis on the six English metropolitan areas outside 
London (where Passenger Transport Executives, or PTEs, have responsibility for coordinating public transport 
networks). Table 1 shows that these areas represent 44% of the bus market outside London (in passenger trips) and 
figure 1 shows that these are the areas where bus mode share for travel to work is at its highest.  
The following section describes our approach to measuring the economic value of bus networks; section three 
provides a cost-benefit analysis of three key bus subsidy streams and section four concludes the article. 
 
This article is based on the 2014 pteg report “The case for the urban bus: the economic value of bus networks in 
the metropolitan areas”, which provides additional background information as well as a detailed description of the 
methodology employed in this work. 
Table 1. Bus patronage and bus mileage (2011/12). Sources: DfT Bus Statistics TablesBUS0103, BUS0820, BUS0821, BUS0203, BUS0205 
 Total trips 
(million) 
 
Older & disabled concessionary trips  
(million) 
Total bus 
network 
(million bus-
miles) 
Metropolitan areas (PTEs) 1,041 304 351 
Shire and unitary areas (rest of  England) 1,314 456 656 
London 2,324 305 302 
TOTAL 4,679 1,065 1,309 
2. Measuring the economic value of bus networks 
Our methodology for valuing the economic contribution of bus networks is rooted in welfare economics and the 
British cost-benefit analysis tradition. We attempt to measure (1) the economic benefits derived by users and (2) the 
economic benefits derived by non-users, including decongestion, agglomeration impacts, option and non-use values, 
and other externalities. 
2.1. User benefits 
Bus networks serve many different markets, each of which is likely to put a different value on bus services. In 
understanding and quantifying user benefits we have therefore segmented the bus market into homogeneous groups, 
which are expected to behave in a similar way and derive the same types of benefit. The other objective in 
developing this segmentation is to separate out parts of the network or user groups which benefit from different 
levels of public funding, which will be of use in section three. Table 2 shows the segmentation employed in this 
study. 
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Fig. 1. Proportion of administrative ward working residents in England who commute by bus, showing the six English metropolitan area 
boundaries. Source: analysis by the author based on the Office of National Statistics 2001 Census Travel to work matrix (ONS, 2002). Contains 
Ordnance Survey and National Statistics data © Crown copyright and databases right 2011 
To assess the value of bus trips currently being made it is necessary to understand what value each passenger puts 
on the bus service, over and above the fare paid . Some passengers would have been willing to pay substantially 
more, for example if they were making a particularly valuable trip and had limited affordable alternatives available: 
others would pay no more than the current fare, for example if they had good cheaper alternatives available. To 
represent how willingness to pay varies across existing and potential users we have derived market demand 
functions for each of our market segments. This expresses a relationship between the fare level and the number of 
bus trips made and can be seen as representing the willingness to pay of different users. Demand functions have 
Contains Ordnance Survey and National Statistics data  
© Crown copyright and databases right 2011 
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been derived from work originally carried out by Dargay and Hanly (2002) and Preston (1998). By integrating the 
inverse demand function (which measures willingness to pay for the market as a whole) we are then able to estimate 
the total benefits derived by each of our market segments over and above the average fare paid (Consumer Surplus). 
The appendix to the full report for this project provides detailed information on the derivation of demand functions. 
Table 3 summarises the results of our analysis. It shows that, across the six English metropolitan areas, bus travel 
generates user benefits over and above the fare paid in excess of £1.3 billion per year, or close to £1.30 per trip. 
Table 2. Bus market demand segmentation (PTE areas). Source: Author’s estimates; The proportion of concessionary travel and total number of 
bus trips are based on DfT Bus Statistics - the remaining figures are based on analysis of the English National Travel Survey 2008-2010. 
  Share of demand Annual bus trips (million) 
 Concessionary (older and disabled) 29% 304 
 Children (<16) 13% 131 
Adult Commuter/business/education/peak 20% 203 
Leisure/personal/shopping/off-peak 30% 310 
Early morning (6-7am) 2% 17 
Late evening/night (7pm-6am) 4% 43 
Sunday 3% 32 
 Total  1,041 
Table 3. User benefits from bus travel (PTE areas). 
  CS (£m) Net CS/trip 
(£) 
Willingness to 
pay/trip (£) 
 Concessionary (older and disabled) 463 1.5 1.5 
 Children (<16) 144 1.1 1.6 
Adult Commuter/business/education/peak 301 1.5 2.6 
Leisure/personal/shopping/off-peak 296 1.0 2.1 
Early morning (6-7am) 32 1.9 3.0 
Late evening/night (7pm-6am) 67 1.6 2.7 
Sunday 14 0.4 1.6 
 Total/Average 1,317 1.27 2.00 
2.2. Non-user benefits and externalities 
Changes in public transport demand can have a large impact on non-users. Reduced congestion benefits society 
and reduces pollution, noise, accidents and greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that 
even those people who choose not to travel by bus on a regular basis place a stand-by, or option, value on the 
availability of bus services. But many others who do not use the bus at all value the fact that their family, friends and 
employees are able to rely on bus networks. Spread over a large number of infrequent and non-users, these benefits 
can add up to a large number. Finally, bus networks also make a critical, if often under-valued, contribution to the 
growth, efficiency and productivity of city centres and dense urban areas. 
 
Decongestion benefits, accidents and environmental externalities 
Decongestion is the largest non-user benefit generated by bus networks and its mechanics are easy to grasp. If a 
large proportion of peak bus trips were to transfer onto cars, then roads would become significantly more congested, 
therefore resulting in lost productive and leisure time.  
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In order to estimate the value of decongestion benefits, we start by calculating the number of trips which would 
transfer to the private car in the absence of bus networks. Some trips would no longer be made, as the additional cost 
and inconvenience or lack of suitable alternatives, would outweigh the benefits derived from the activities at the 
destination end. The majority of trips, however, would continue to take place, either by another form of public 
transport, by walking and cycling, by taxi or by private car (we have assumed the proportion of trips which would 
transfer to the private car to be 31%, which is consistent with the average figure suggested in TRL, 2004, table 9.9; 
however, this varies by market segment and our assumptions are documented in more detail in the appendix to the 
full project report). 
In some cases, individuals would continue to travel but might change their destination to reflect the relative 
accessibility provided by different modes. This could have an additional detrimental effect on city centres, which we 
briefly discuss in the original project report. 
Once an estimate of the number of additional car trips has been obtained we follow the relatively well-established 
methodology set out in the English Department for Transport’s Transport Analysis Guidance (WebTAG) to estimate 
and value decongestion and externality impacts. The appendix to the full report for this project provides more 
detailed information on the derivation of decongestion and externality benefits. 
Table 4. Externality benefits from bus travel by market segment 
  Decongestion Other externalities (including accidents) 
  pence/bus trip 
£ million 
per year pence/bus trip 
£m 
p.y. 
Concessionary 24 72 4 13 
Children (<16) 56 73 5 6 
Adults Commuter/business/education/peak 270 549 14 29 
Leisure/personal/shopping/off-peak 39 120 6 18 
Early morning (6-7am) 49 8 13 2 
Late evening/night (7pm-6am) 52 22 6 2 
Sunday 15 5 4 1 
 Sub-Total  850  72 
 Bus network externalities   -229  -24 
 TOTAL  621  48 
 
Table 4 summarises the results from this analysis. We estimate that in the absence of bus networks there would 
be an additional 209 million car trips on road networks in metropolitan areas every year, equating to an estimated 
3% increase in overall traffic levels and a 21% increase in city centre car traffic at peak times (This was estimated 
by dividing the proportion of new car trips relative to existing bus trips - 50% for 
peak/commuting/business/education - by the market share ratio between bus and car - 20%/40% for the main town 
and city centres). To accommodate this additional traffic in a city the size of Manchester or Birmingham would 
require two new dual carriageway roads to be built through the centre of those cities. The additional congestion and 
externalities would have a cost in excess of £620 million per year, even after accounting for the impact of reductions 
in bus traffic . This is equivalent to around half the level of user benefits estimated earlier. As expected, peak time 
trips have, by far, the largest impact on congestion, amounting to £2.70 per bus trip. 
 
Option and non-use value 
Non-users and infrequent users can also derive significant additional benefits in the form of option and non-use 
values.  
Option value stems from the fact that bus networks are the default stand-by option for many infrequent users 
when their main mode of travel isn’t available, for example when the car is in the garage or when weather 
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conditions make walking and cycling unattractive. Research has shown that, on average, regular bus users would be 
willing to pay up to £60 per year, and infrequent users £38 per year, in order to ensure that a bus service remained 
available (Mackie et al, 2012). This work has estimated the option value of bus networks at £700m for the whole of 
England, equivalent to 30p per bus-km and almost twice the cost of BSOG. Taking option values to be proportional 
to the number of bus trips, we estimate the total option value of PTE bus networks to be around £188m per year. 
Non-use value refers to the benefits accruing to individuals who are unlikely to use bus networks themselves. 
This could include, for example, the benefits to parents when children no longer need to be escorted or where the 
bus network enables visits by family and friends. Non-use values tend to be much lower than option values and so 
we have not made an attempt to separately calculate these benefits. 
 
Denser and more productive urban economies (wider economic impacts) 
Bus networks make an important contribution towards the free flow of people and goods in urban areas. 
However, these decongestion benefits simply measure the direct impacts in terms of reduced journey times. For 
certain industries, an efficient urban transport network, providing high accessibility to town and city centres, can 
generate additional second order productivity impacts, for example through agglomeration economies and by 
enabling access to a deeper labour markets.  
We have attempted to quantify these benefits by following the English Department for Transport’s Wider 
Economic Impacts methodology (DfT, 2012a). We have concentrated on estimating agglomeration benefits , the 
largest of these impacts, which are defined as the increased productivity that results from a greater effective density 
of jobs in a given area (effective density is a weighted function of the travel cost and time required to reach 
neighbouring businesses).  
Based on some broad assumptions1 , documented in more detail in the full project report, we have estimated that, 
in the absence of bus networks, there would be an overall loss of productivity in PTE areas equivalent to £427m of 
GDP, around 90% of which would occur in town and city centres. This is around half of the decongestion benefits 
previously calculated. 
2.3. Metropolitan bus networks – an economic balance sheet 
Table 5 summarises the results of our analysis. It shows that bus networks generate economic benefits in excess 
of £2.5 billion per year across the six English metropolitan areas. This compares with a cost of £524 million in 
public funding as noted in table two. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that this does not amount to a cost benefit analysis since these economic 
benefits are not entirely dependent on the availability of public funding. In the next section, we attempt to estimate 
the benefit-cost ratio of the three main public funding streams currently in operation. 
3. Value for money of bus subsidy streams 
In this section, we describe cost-benefit analyses of the three main public funding streams which support bus 
networks and bus passengers in England: free concessionary travel, fuel  duty rebate (BSOG) and support for non-
commercial bus routes (tendered networks). Table 6 shows the monetary value of each of these funding streams to 
the bus industry in different parts of England. The purpose of this exercise is not to compare the relative merits of 
each of these funding streams, as they target different policy objectives, but rather to highlight the mechanisms 
through which different funding streams generate social and economic benefits. 
 
 
 
1 Summary of key assumptions: half of all jobs in producer and consumer services based in city centre areas; all other jobs located in suburban 
areas; GDP per job assumed spatially uniform within each business sector; current average car generalised cost taken as £3.90 per trip based on 
NTS/DfT data; impact of bus service withdrawal assumed to lead to an increase in Generalised Cost of 92p/trip for city centre businesses and 
4p/trip for suburban businesses (based on estimate of decongestion benefits); Job and GDP figures by local authority taken from WebTAG Unit 
3.5.14. 
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Table 5. Economic benefits of PTE bus networks – summary table, £ million per year, 2010 prices 
 User 
benefits 
Option 
value 
Decongestion Other 
Exts. 
Wider Econ. 
Impacts 
Concessionary (older and disabled) 463 
 
72 13 
 
Children (<16) 144 73 6 
Peak (Commuter/business/ education) 301 549 29 
Off-peak (Leisure/personal/ 
shopping) 
296 120 18 
Early morning (6-7am) 32 8 2 
Late evening/night (7pm-6am) 67 22 2 
Sunday 14 5 1 
Sub-Total 1,317 188 850 72 427 
Bus externalities   -229 -24  
Change in fuel taxation revenue    -90   
Sub-Total 1,317 188 531 48 427 
TOTAL £2,511 
Table 6. Bus industry revenue, £ million per year, 2011/12 figures. Source: DfT Bus Statistics Tables BUS0501a, BUS0810 and BUS0811 
 Farebox 
revenue (£m) 
Concessionary  
reimbursement 
BSOG (fuel 
subsidy) 
Tendered 
Network 
Support 
TOTAL 
PTEs 763 302 111 129 1,306 
London 1,117 210 111 519 1,956 
Shire and unitary areas  1,125 483 208 346 2,163 
TOTAL 3,005 995 430 994 5,425 
3.1. Free travel for older and disabled people 
From April 2008, residents in England, aged 60 and over or with an eligible disability became entitled to free, 
off-peak (after 9.30am) travel on local buses, anywhere in the country. This extended a similar concession which 
had existed since 2006 enabling free bus travel for the same group within a resident’s Local Authority area. There 
are currently nine million older people’s passes and 748,000 disabled passes in circulation in England (source: DfT 
Bus Statistics Table BUS0820).  
Table 7 summarises our assessment of the benefits, costs and overall benefit-cost ratio of the national free 
concession in metropolitan areas. Our assumptions and analysis are documented in the appendix to the main project 
report and detailed workings can be obtained from the paper’s author. Below, we discuss each of these factors in 
more detail. 
Given that the ENTCS is effectively a transfer between taxpayers and eligible individuals, the greatest proportion 
of benefits from the scheme naturally accrue to users, in particular to those who would have used the bus in the 
absence of the concession.  
A large part of the rationale for the scheme stems from the fact that older users have a higher level of deprivation 
than the population at large. Dargay and Liu (2010) show that, in metropolitan areas in 2001, of those bus users 
eligible for the concession, only 28% had access to a car, compared to 54% of other bus users and 80% of the 
population at large.  
Although by 2008 this proportion had gone up to 45%, bus trip rates for individuals from non-car owning 
households were still five times greater than for those with access to a car (3.7 and 0.8 trips per week respectively). 
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The same authors also show that reliance on the bus increases rapidly with age (16% of all trips by 85+ year olds are 
by bus compared to 8% for 60-69 year olds) whereas income, mobility and health are all likely to evolve in the 
opposite direction. The ENCTS can therefore be seen as a relatively effective redistributive mechanism. 
Another point to note is that the benefits to new users  are achieved at a comparatively low cost (£69m of 
benefits, net of deadweight loss , for a cost to tax-payers of £22m, implying a benefit-cost ratio – BCR – above 3:1 
for this part of the expenditure).  This is because the marginal cost to operators of carrying an additional off-peak 
passenger, once a service is already running, is almost negligible  in comparison to the average fare level . This fact 
means that the concession brings demand and fare levels closer to their welfare maximising optimum. 
Moreover, the increase in bus service frequency that it is estimated would be required to accommodate additional 
passengers could generate further benefits to non-concessionary bus users of around £27m, taking the partial BCR to 
4.3:1. 
Table 7. Welfare assessment of the national concessionary travel scheme, 2011/12, £ million per year 
 Benefits   Costs 
Welfare gain to old users (transfer) 232  Reimbursement for revenue 
forgone 
232 
Welfare gain to new users, attracted by free travel  69  Reimbursement for additional 
capacity costs 
22 
Deadweight welfare loss ( equivalent to the gain in 
consumer surplus to those passengers unwilling to 
cover their marginal cost) 
-0.5    
Decongestion/other externalities (net of indirect 
taxation) 
42    
Wider Economic Impacts (WI1) 19    
     
Welfare gains to other (non-concessionary) bus 
users, due to increased frequency 
27    
Health benefits (equally split between users and 
government/society) 
16    
Bus externalities -20    
Indirect taxation -8    
Total 377   254 
Benefit:Cost Ratio 1.5 : 1    
 
Turning now to non-user benefits, our calculations suggests that the increase in demand as a result of the 
concession has led to a reduction in congestion and other private transport externalities, as well as positive wider 
economic impacts, amounting to £52m per year (net of bus externalities).  
Finally, research by Kelly (2011) has suggested that the move from the local to a national concession led to an 
increase in the number of walking trips amongst pass-holders of around six per year. Using New Zealand Transport 
Agency’s estimate of the health benefits of walking trips of around £1 per additional km walked (NZTA, 2008), we 
calculate that this will have led to an additional £16m in annual economic benefits.  
Overall, our analysis suggests that the ENCTS generates a benefit cost ratio of around 1.5:1. The characteristics 
of public transport (low marginal costs, user and non-user externalities, including health benefits) explain why this 
benefit-cost ratio is significantly higher than a figure below 1 which a straightforward transfer might typically 
imply. 
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3.2. Fuel subsidy (Bus Service Operators Grant – BSOG) 
In England, bus operators are entitled to claim some of their fuel tax back from government, a subsidy known as 
the Bus Service Operators Grant (BSOG). In 2013, the payment rate for diesel was 34.6 pence/litre (having been cut 
from 43.2pence/litre in April 2012). Since 2010, eligible operators have also received an 8% uplift in their BSOG 
payment rate for buses with operational smartcard readers, and an additional 2% for buses with Automatic Vehicle 
Location (AVL) Equipment.  
We have assumed, for the purpose of this analysis, that the impact of BSOG can be analysed as if it were a 
straightforward transfer between tax-payers and bus users, much in the same way as concessionary travel and 
without any leakage into higher profit margins. Although BSOG is paid out in a way that may create incentives for 
operators to allocate the subsidy in different proportions to each market segment, separate analysis we have 
undertaken for English metropolitan areas suggests that, in practice, it amounts to a fairly uniform subsidy per 
passenger trip. 
It could be argued that operators have discretion over their use of BSOG and that they may prefer to use it, for 
example, to increase frequencies rather than to reduce fares. However, our analysis strongly suggests that at current 
levels, fare reductions are likely to be much more effective in increasing demand and generating economic benefits. 
This may, of course, not be the case where fares and service quality are comparatively lower. We also acknowledge 
that a small proportion of BSOG is paid out as an environmental incentive. For simplicity, in this report we focus 
purely on the mileage-based component and assume operators use BSOG entirely to reduce commercial fares. 
If we accept these assumptions, then BSOG should in principle generate the same types of benefit as 
concessionary travel: existing user benefits (transfer), new user benefits, decongestion/externality benefits and 
second order benefits from increased frequency. However, the relative magnitude of each of these effects varies 
compared to other policies as each market segment is exposed to different levels of congestion and has a varying 
degree of sensitivity to fares. Given the complexity of bus markets, we have made a number of simplifying 
assumptions to approximate the value for money of BSOG, which are documented in the appendix to the full project 
report. 
Table 8 summarises our assessment of the benefits, costs and overall benefit-cost ratio of BSOG in English 
metropolitan areas. 
 
As in the case of concessionary travel, the greatest proportion of benefits (just under half) accrues to those 
passengers who would have used the bus even in the absence of the subsidy. For them, BSOG equates to an average 
fare reduction of 25p per trip plus a boost in service frequency. As we have previously argued, there is a strong 
equity argument in support of this transfer.  
In contrast with the free concession, however, the net cost of the BSOG transfer is relatively low since the 
revenue forgone is almost entirely compensated by the revenue generated from new passengers who are persuaded 
to use the bus at the lower fare. On the other hand, the reduction in commercial fares would result in a decrease in 
concessionary reimbursement which we expect operators to seek to compensate from the available subsidy. 
The welfare benefit to generated passengers is estimated at £16m. However, this results in additional operating 
costs of £72m and increased bus-induced congestion and externalities worth £14m. The extent to which this would 
be the case in practice depends on the degree of crowding at the time when the new passengers choose to travel – 
our calculations are based on relatively conservative assumptions, broadly consistent with those used in the DfT’s 
Concessionary Reimbursement Guidance (DfT, 2013). However, some would argue that additional capacity 
requirements would be virtually negligible outside peak hours, which would increase the benefit-cost ratio (see, for 
example, Abrantes and Last, 2011). 
Generated passengers also create significant benefits for other road users and society at large, largely in the form 
of decongestion and wider economic impacts amounting to just over £155m. This figure represents a much larger 
proportion of total benefits than in the case of concessionary travel. This is because commercial passengers tend to 
travel at more congested times of day, when decongestion benefits of bus travel are greatest.  
Based on fairly conservative assumptions, we estimate that the benefit cost ratio of BSOG is 2.8 :1199. The 
appendix to the full project report includes an assessment of the impact of alternative assumptions, suggesting that 
the BCR could be as high as 3.2:1. One further caveat is that where new fare paying passengers are transferring from 
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existing subsidised public transport modes, this may result in an increase in subsidy elsewhere. However, we would 
expect this to be a relatively small effect across metropolitan areas as a whole. 
Table 8. Welfare assessment of the Bus Service Operator Grant (BSOG), 2011/12, £ million per year 
 Benefits   Costs 
Welfare gain to existing users 
(transfer) 
151  Revenue forgone 151 
Welfare gain to existing users due to 
increased frequency 
16  Additional operating 
costs 
72 
Welfare gain to new users 16  Generated Revenue -124 
Decongestion/other externalities 106  Concessionary 
reimbursement forgone 
12 
Wider Economic Impacts (WI1) 49    
Bus congestion and externalities -14    
Indirect taxation -10    
Total 314   111 
Benefit:Cost Ratio 2.8 : 1    
3.3. Socially necessary services (tendered networks) 
Since 1986, bus services outside London have been privately operated under a deregulated framework. In 
practice, this means that local transport authorities (PTEs/ITAs in metropolitan areas) have no direct control over 
commercial services but can competitively tender services which would not be operated without subsidy. Although 
it is often thought that tendered services are mainly justified on social equity grounds, we show in this section that 
many tendered services are also likely to represent good value for money against more conventional economic 
criteria. 
Let’s start by taking the example of a typical bus route, 10km in length and with an average operating cost of 
£1.80/km (sources: DfT Bus Statistics Tables BUS0406 and BUS0203, 2010/11 figures). Its total operating cost for 
a single round bus trip would be £32; if we assume an average commercial fare of £1.15 (this is the average farebox 
revenue divided by the estimated number of adult fare paying passengers; sources: DfT Bus Statistics Tables 
BUS0401 and BUS0203)  and an average passenger trip length of 6.9km (source: National Travel Survey, DfT, 
2011) , then a bus would need to pick up around 16 adult commercial passengers each way to break even (bearing in 
mind some would be travelling for free and others would be travelling at a higher fare). This corresponds to an 
average load factor of around 11 pax-km/bus-km (excluding children and older/disabled concessionary passengers). 
However, if a weekday evening service was only able to attract, for example, 10 passengers per leg then it would 
require an annual subsidy of £3,380. 
For early morning and late evening services, we know that the proportion of children and concessionary 
passengers is negligible and so our preceding analysis is likely to be accurate. At other times of day, the breakeven 
number of passengers would be higher, probably in excess of 20 passengers per leg. In the rest of our analysis, we 
concentrate on early morning/late evening services, while acknowledging that the value for money of other types of 
tendered service would be lower for an equivalent number of passenger boardings.  
Based on our earlier analysis we have estimated net subsidy and economic benefits (user benefits, decongestion, 
externalities, indirect taxation and option values) for typical weekday early morning and evening services. With the 
exception of option values, which we have assumed to accrue on a uniform basis per bus-km, benefits are 
257 Pedro A.L. Abrantes /  Transportation Research Procedia  8 ( 2015 )  247 – 258 
proportional to the number of passengers carried. Figure 2 illustrates the results by representing economic benefits 
and public subsidy as a function of bus boardings.  
Our analysis shows that for boardings above 10 passengers/bus-trip (equivalent to a load factor of 6.9 given 
prevailing trip lengths), economic benefits outweigh net subsidy by a factor of at least 3:1. For boardings above 6 
passengers/bus-trip (load factor of 4.1), economic benefits continue to outweigh costs. Below that point, subsidy 
begins to overtake economic benefits. Note, however, that bus services are likely to be a cost effective alternative to 
taxi services down to at least 4 boardings per bus leg (assuming a taxi occupancy of two passengers), which could 
be seen as a suitable threshold for supporting tendered services on social grounds. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Economic benefits and public subsidy as a function of the number of bus boardings 
Data from the English PTEs shows average boardings per bus-trip on tendered services above 10. This would 
suggest most PTE tendered services currently represent very good value for money, even if we were to provide an 
allowance for a proportion of concessionary passengers. More generally, this analysis demonstrates that there are 
likely to be a large number of bus services which, despite not being commercially viable, can deliver large net 
economic benefits to users and society at large and therefore warrant pubic funding. Funding cuts to tendered bus 
networks in PTE areas are therefore likely to hit services with a high net economic value. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to quantify the economic contribution of bus networks and demonstrate the value for 
money of public subsidy in this area. Although buses may lack the visibility of other forms of public transport, we 
have shown that they generate over £2.5 billion of economic benefits every year in English metropolitan areas. This 
is around five times the level of public funding they receive and more than three times total farebox revenue. 
Just over £1.3bn of total benefits accrue to passengers, who would otherwise have been unable to reach work, 
education and other opportunities, or would have been faced with a steep increase in travel costs. That equates to a 
net benefit per passenger trip of £1.27, over and above the commercial fare. The remaining £1.2bn of benefits accrue 
to other road users and society at large, essentially through decongestion, reduced accidents, pollution, the stand-by 
value of bus networks and increased economic productivity. The majority of non-user benefits arise in peak periods, 
when congestion is most severe. We estimate that each peak bus trip generates decongestion benefits of £2.70. 
We have also carried out a cost-benefit analysis of the three main sources of public funding for bus networks in 
England: free concessionary travel for older and disabled people; fuel duty rebate (BSOG); and support for tendered 
services. Our analysis shows that these funding streams are not only an effective re-distribution mechanism but also 
generate considerable economic benefits to society at large. 
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We have found that the free concession generates economic benefits of £1.48 for every £1 of public money spent. 
This work also shows that the majority of funding and benefits actually flow to those who would have used the bus 
in the absence of the concession. These people would have come disproportionately from the lowest income groups 
in society, which makes this an effective social policy tool as it does away with the need to resort to complicated 
means-testing arrangements. 
We have estimated fuel duty rebate (BSOG) to generate at least £2.80 of economic benefits for every £1 of public 
money spent. Around half of those benefits accrue to society at large through reduced congestion, accidents, 
pollution and improved productivity. This means tax-payers have got their money’s worth before the benefits to bus 
users are taken into account. 
Our assessment of tendered services has demonstrated that even where services cannot be operated commercially, 
they may still deliver substantial benefits. Our analysis suggests that, for early morning services in particular, PTE 
funding is delivering in excess of £3 of benefits for every £1 of public money. Although this figure will vary for 
different types of service, it shows that increased funding for tendered services is likely to be highly cost-effective, 
especially when we consider the vital nature of these services for those seeking work or in low paid jobs. 
The fact that the economic benefits to society as a whole outweigh the revenue to bus operators and the private 
gains to passengers should be taken as a prima facie case for public funding of bus networks. Given the current 
declining trend in public funding for bus networks in England, we believe that the wide range of benefits which bus 
networks generate need to be better understood and acknowledged across government departments. We hope that 
this paper contributes to this debate. 
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